## Approved For Release 2003/12/19 : CIA-RDP78T04759A00830001Top-Secret



# DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

# Imagery Analysis Service Notes

24 May 1968

**Declass Review by NIMA/DOD** 

Top Secret

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FIGURE 3. DONGUZ OPERATIONS/LAUNCH AREA,

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USSR

Newly Identified Surface-to-Air Weapons Training/Test Range

It can now be determined that a previously unidentified installation near Donguz, 14 nautical miles south of Orenburg, is a surface-to-air weapons training/test range. We believe, for the following reasons, that training/testing for the Ganef missile system has been conducted at this installation:

- 1. The six launch pads identified at Donguz are similar in size to the six pads at Launch Area A, Emba Missile Test Center (see Figures 3 and 4).
- 2. One launch pad in particular is almost identical in appearance to pad A-I at Emba.
- 3. Ganef missiles have been identified at Orenburg AAA Barracks East, which may perform an assembly and maintenance training function.
- 4. There are COMINT reports of flight activity involving Emba, Orenburg, and Donguz.

The range itself (Figure 5) consists of an operations/launch area, an air warning radar facility, a downrange tracking facilit<u>y, an im</u>pact area, and various support facilities. It was first seen on Mission and has since been seen on large-scale coverage only once, on (IAS has requested new

high-resolution photography of this facility.)

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


FIGURE 5. DONGUZ SURFACE-TO-AIR WEAPONS TRAINING/TEST RANGE,

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


FIGURE 7. CONSTRUCTION TIMING OF THE SAWRFS, MAY 1968.

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#### CHINA

### Current Status of the Suspect Advanced Weapons Related Facilities (SAWRFs)

With the identification on of two additional SAWRFs in early stages of construction north of the Shuang-cheng-tzu Missile Test Center, there are a total of seven such facilities known to be under construction in China. Four of these are north of the Shuang-cheng-tzu rangehead and the other three are in the North China plain. We have obtained no new evidence about any of these facilities which would aid in assigning them a more definite function.

One of the new SAWRFs near Shuang-cheng-tzu, designated SCT #3. was ]; SCT #4 is new since [ begun sometime after 25X1D Meanwhile, construction of the original two Shuang-cheng-tzu facilities has accelerated after a winter slowdown. Work at Shih-chia-chuang and the two SAWRFs near Peking appears to be progressing steadily. Figure 7 summarizes what we now know about the construction timing of the identified SAWRFs.

A comparison of the four SAWRFs now under construction north of Shuangcheng-tzu reveals the following points:

- 1. Although their configurations are similar enough to be recognizable, the axes of their interior corridors do not appear to have any common orientation.
- 2. Except for SCT #I (the one nearest the Mongolian Border), each is supported by a large complex of more than 70 buildings of which the majority are barracks-type.
- 3. SCT #2 and #4 are both rail served, while #1 is about 50 nm and #3 about 20 nm by graded road from the nearest rail line.

The SAWRFs at Shuang-cheng-tzu have been chronologically designated by NPIC as SCT #I through 4. The SAWRFs referred to as #5 and #3in the IAS NOTES of 19 October and I December 1967, are now designated #1 and #2 respectively.

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